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The basic concepts of the law as they pertain
to urology ,are no different from any other part of the
law which pertains to the medical profession. I shall
not spend a lot of time going over that, except to say
that you owe the same duty that any other physician
owes to a patient, and that is to exercise that degree
of oare which the average urologist would exercise
under the same or similar circumstances. The courts
generally say further, "in the same or similar communities," and then qualify it still further by saying,
"regard being had for the state of medical science
at the time." It narrows down to the fact that you
do not have to be the best, but you cannot be the
worst. If you conform to this standard, you have a
reasonably good chance of staying out of trouble
as far as the law is concerned.
Now let's go into two or three areas which have
arisen recently and which should give all of the
medical profession some concern. I am sure you
have heard the term "informed consent." Basically,
the term "consent" itself implies that if you do a
procedure upon a patient without the patient's permission, you have committed a battery on that patient, and the patient is entitled to recover for any
damages done. No expert testimony is required, and
you can be liable for punitive damages which your
malpractice insurance carrier will not pay. This is
a very narrow field because very seldom do physicians today do procedures without some type of
permission or consent.
But the area of "informed" consent is a much
more complex proposition, and the problems are
steadily increasing, both medically and legally. The
underlying concept to this whole proposition is
fundamental to American jurisprudence; that is, that
every human being of adult years and of sound mind
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has a right to determine what shall be done to his
own body. There are numerous ex,amples of this.
One of the classic examples is that of the Jehovah's
Witnesses who, because of their convictions, will not
accept blood transfusions. The courts, all the way to
the Supreme Court of the United States, have uniformly held that a person has such a right of refusal
even if it means his death, and you have no right to
intervene. When you get down to the basic premise
that each individual should be allowed to determine
what happens to him, no one can question the
validity of the principle. It's good and it's sound.
There are ramifications, though, when the patient
has given consent but where a complication or risk
develops. If the patient has not been told about the
risk, he may bring a suit contending that he was not
adequately informed and had he been, he would not
have consented. This is not a battery, although in
some places this has been attempted in order to get
punitive damages. The courts uniformly recognize
that this is no more than a breach of duty, the duty
that you have to treat your patient properly. There
is a duty to inform the patient of what you are going
to attempt to do and the possible complications and
risks, and a failure to do so amounts only to a breach
of that duty. It is treated in the same category as any
other negligence action.
From this, then, let us consider the two basic
principles which must be kept in mind. First of all,
the patient has a right of self-determination, and this
imposes upon you the duty to make a disclosure to
him. Second, the amount of the disclosure is to be
measured in terms of "reasonable." Basically, that
is what the courts have said, and that is what the
duty is based upon. These principles are generally
recognized, although I must say they are not recognized in all places, and have been treated rather
oasually in some places. The majority rule among the
states today is that in determining how much is to
be disclosed to a patient, the same rule is followed
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as determines the standard of care in treating the
patient, namely, what the standard is within the
medical community. This is generally followed and
has been a reasonably good defense up until now. I
might say, for those of you who are from Virginia,
the question has not arisen here, and I do not
anticipate ariy great problems.
There are two recent cases, however, which
throw a shadow over the whole question of consent
and disclosure. They do not set forth any specific
rules to be followed, but they do establish that the
duty goes much further than anyone had ever contemplated. The first was a case from the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia handed down in
May 1972. To summarize briefly, a nineteen-yearold male had only a back pain. He was seen by a
series of physicians and finally by a neurosurgeon
who recommended that he have a laminectomy. He
was not told that about 1 % of the laminectomies end
up with some sort of paralysis. He agreed to the
operation, and unfortunately, after a chain of varying events, he became paralyzed. The District Court
which heard the case ruled, as a matter of law, in
favor of the physicians, both on the question of
malpractice and negligence in the way the operation
was performed and also on the failure to inform
the patient of all the risks involved. The Court of
Appeals reversed the case on all issues and sent it
back for trial on the merits. Some of the statements
made by the court are general statements which
apply across the board:
Due care demands that the physician warn
the patient of any risks to his well-being
by the contemplated therapy. The patient
must have some understanding and familiarity with the therapeutic alternatives and
their hazards. The physician must disclose
the choices and the dangers inherently and
potentially involved.
Those are rather broad, sweeping admonitions.
The court said that the standard is "what is reason~
able under the circumstances and that this is not
to be determined solely by the physician." The court
went on to say that this is a matter in which laymen
have knowledge and are in a position to express an
opinion or view. It is not in the same category as the
type of treatment that should be rendered for a
particular condition. All of the risks which potentially affect the decision to be made by the patient
must be revealed. The court defines this by saying,

"A risk is thus material when a reasonable person,
in what the physician knows or should know to be
the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding
whether or not to forego the proposed therapy."
That is a way of saying that you must put yourself
in the patient's position, so to speak, in prospect and
not in retrospect. If a reasonable person, knowing
what the risk is, might forego the procedure, you
must tell him what the risk is. The court has gone
further and said, "A very small chance of death
or serious disability may well be significant; a potential disability which dramatically outweighs the potential benefit of the therapy or the detriments of the
existing malady may summon discussion with the
patient."
Whenever nondisclosure or particular risk information is open to debate by reasonable-minded
men-laymen, not physicians-the issue is for the
finder of the fact, the jury. What in effect the court
has said is that the question of whether or not the
patient should have been told about certain risks
is going to be a jury issue in every case. No matter
how many times the court may instruct the jury that
they are not to view the case in retrospect, it is
impossible for them not to do so. They cannot get
out of their minds what has already happened.
The second case came up even more recently
than the first-in October 1972 in California. In
this particular instance, the surgery was for the
treatment of a duodenal ulcer, a very small duodenal
ulcer that had been very difficult to diagnose, even
by x-ray. The surgeon explained that there were
certain risks in the general anesthesia. He explained
the nature of the operation, but none of the inherent
risks, one of which is that in a certain percentage
of the cases-I think about 5%-there may be some
injury to the spleen or its adjoining structures. The
patient did have injury to the spleen because one of
the arteries broke loose, and he almost bled to death
internally. Neither did the physician explain that
the evolution of a new ulcer might occur; he got
one of those. The patient had several other complications and he sued the doctors and the hospital.
This court came to the same general principle as the
court in the District of Columbia, holding that, as to
the duty to disclose available choices of therapy and
dangers inherently and potentially involved, the physician must comply. The right of self-decision by the
patient is the measure of the defendant's duty to
reveal.
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Now, both of these cases recognize two general
exceptions which you should keep in mind. One is
in the case of an emergency or where the patient is
incapable of making a decision because of mental
incompetency or infancy. If the treatment is immediately necessary, you can proceed without any type
of consent. If the patient is incapable of making any
type of decision because of infancy, the P,arents can
certainly be fully advised and the consent obtained
from them, if there is no emergency situation. The
second refers again to the majority rule and there
the court says that where the welfare of the patient
dictates that he should not be told, there is reason
not to tell him, but the burden of proving this is on
the physician, not on the patient. In other words,
this is an excuse or a reason for nondisclosure. The
burden is on the plaintiff to prove he was not told,
and if he was not, it is up to you to justify not having
told him. The court pointed out that the fact that
the patient may decide not to have therapy is not
reason for not telling him.
One court pointed out that nondisclosure is
justified only where the reaction to the risk information, as reasonably seen by the physician, is menacing, almost Hfe threatening to the patient. That is
almost the only instance in which you would be
justified in not telling the patient. In this regard, I
should warn you that you must have expert testimony to back up your decision. In the case in the
District of Columbia, the surgeon testified that it was
not in the best interest of the patient to tell him
that he might be paralyzed from this laminectomy.
The court paid no attention to that statement whatsoever, saying that it was for the jury to decide, since
the physician was the only one who said this, and
he had not given any background or any medical
reason why it would have been harmful to the
patient. There was no reason to believe that he was
emotionally unstable or anything of that kind. I
realize full well the restraints this places upon the
medical profession, but I do not think we can ignore
the fact that to some extent a person does have a
right to determine what is going to happen to him.
Both of these cases attempted to set forth
certain types of things that a patient should or
should not be told and little can be derived from
reviewing these, because they do not make that
much sense. One of the cases, for instance, referred
to minor procedures and complicated procedures,
and what you do in one case and what you do in
the other. Of course, you can imagine what's going
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to happen when someone says, "Well, it wasn't
minor, afterall; it was complicated."
There is another type of situation you encounter in "informed consent" cases. A patient was
to have an arteriogram performed. There was no
emergency; it was not necessary at the time that it
be done; it was an optional procedure. The surgeon
did not tell him that there was a risk of paralysis
inherent, and he became paralyzed. The plaintiff
recovered-that is, a verdict against the doctor.
In another case, a patient of oriental descent
developed hypopigmentation-I believe it was during pregnancy. She consulted a dermatologist, who
recommended dermabrasion, but he did not tell her
that it was only 50% effective and that the condition
might even be worse after he finished. It was worse,
and she sued him. There was no question in that
case. The court said that he had failed to conform
to the duty imposed upon him to advise the patient
fully of the successful nature of the operation if performed, and also of its chances of failure.
The courts have said, in effect, that if there is
a serious risk of death or danger of death, even if the
percentage is very small-down to 1 % in one of the
cases-the physician must so advise the patient.
Also, he should explain any alternative methods of
treatment. Frequently, this is omitted. I pave found
this to be true in any number of cases in which I
have been involved. The physician has not told the
patient that there were other methods of treating the
condition, and he has left the patient with the impression that the one recommended by him was the
only one. What it boils down to is this: If the patient doesn't want to take the chance, on what basis
can the medical profession justify forcing him to do
so? If you can answer that question, then you have
solved the problem, because then you can omit
anything you want to.
Some simple "do's" and "don't's": You must or
should disclose the general procedure and generally
what you expect to do, and what the patient should
expect from the procedure. Also, you should identify
the surgeon who is going to perform the surgery,
and whether or not others will assist, particularly
residents. In several of the teaching institutions, I
have found that they do not tell a patient ahead of
time that the surgery may be performed by residents. The risk of serious harm or death, where
applicable, should be disclosed. This would be true
in any major case, or certainly where any general
anesthetic will be used. The peculiar risks of the
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procedure involved should be explained to the patient. There's a greater duty to disclose if the procedure is experimental, new or novel, ultrahazardous,
if there is a possibility of altering the sexual capacity
or fertility of the patient, if it is purely for cosmetic
purposes or if it is an optional procedure.
The "don't's" that you might add to this include: Do not say that any procedure is simple,
under any circumstances. Do not ever tell a patient
that no complication can occur. Do not just answer
the patient's questions and expect that to fulfill your
obligation to fully inform the patient. Do not expect others to make a disclosure for you, such as
the anesthesiologist who may come to see the patient,
or any of the house staff. Do not minimize any part
of the procedure or make a guarantee of any kind or
any statement that resembles a guarantee or an assurance that you or the procedure will cure the patient.
There is one exception, of course, and that is
if the patient specifically does not want to be informed, you do not have to do so. Some people
may not want to be informed of what can happen to
them. If they do not want to, you should not burden
them with it, but you should certainly document the
circumstances very amply and very completely in the
chart.
I point out these two cases because they are
a sharp departure from what has been the rule. How
many states will proceed to follow this I have no idea.
But a word of caution is always in order: If you adequately protect yourself in this regard, you are certainly on the safe side. As I understand it, it is always
better to overtreat than to undertreat.
With respect to infants, I would mention that
the consent should come from the parents; also, that
now in most of the states 18, not 21, is the age of
majority. Suppose an eighteen- or nineteen-year-old
college student comes into your office needing treatment. He has no means of support, and you are concerned about who is going to pay your bill. You get
in touch with the parents and ask them by longdistance telephone if they will take care of the
bill. They tell you that they will. Suppose a long
series of treatment is undertaken, and the bill mounts
into the thousands of dollars. The parents do not
want to pay the bill, and they do not have to. At
least in Virginia, and in most other states, the
promise to pay the debt of another has to be in
writing to be enforceable. This is the so-called
statute of frauds. All you have to do is get the parents to write you a letter and tell you that they are
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responsible for the care and treatment of their child.
Another thing to keep in mind is the value of
a good set of records. One of the primary problems
that I have run into is the inadequacy of some of the
records kept by some of your colleagues, but I am
sure none of you would neglect these. It is customary
not to write down negative findings, but it is very easy
to write down "otherwise negative" after you have
made an examination. At least give some notation
there, since the chart has to be your only means of
remembering several years later that you did make
other examinations. If there is a particular area of
the patient's body that was being treated or was injured at one time and has cleared up, a notation of
this should be made in the chart to back up the
fact that you did an examination.
I spent eight days recently in a case where one
of the main contentions was that a neurological
examination had not been performed upon a patient
from the day he was admitted to the hospital to the
day he was discharged. The physician said that he
had, but there was nothing in the chart to prove it.
We were able to get out of it all right, but it was a
difficult proposition. It is easy to correct. Any time
the patient refuses treatment, this fact should be put
into the chart. If you have a discussion with the
patient with regard to the type of treatment, the
alternatives, the risks, and so forth, this should also
be put in the chart.
It is my recommendation that, if you are going
to perform planned surgery on a patient, you should
take his consent in your office before the patient
goes into the hospital. Then he cannot complain
that he was under sedation, or that he was upset, or
any number of other things that might influence his
making a wise and full decision.
A chart should contain, at each instance, the
complaints of the patient, the history, the type of
examination made, the treatment, the medication, if
any, and any instructions which you gave the
patient. Also, if the patient fails to keep an appointment, you should have your office staff thoroughly
instructed to document this on the chart and then in
the appointment book, and do not throw the appointment books away. There have been several instances where this information was deemed crucial,
and we were able to go back into the records and
prove that a patient had failed to keep an appointment, after the patient had testified that he was never
told to come back.
I need not emphasize that any treatment which
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may in any way affect the sexual ability of the
patient is particularly sensitive, apparently for everyone and should be well documented. This should be
thoroughly explained to the patient; even the remote
possibilities should be thoroughly explained. If there
is any question about it, it would not hurt to obtain
written consent. There have been several cases recently where physicians who have performed vasectomies have been sued because the operations were
not effective. There have been cases where people
have been allowed a recovery of damages for the
cost of rearing a perfectly normal child who was
unwanted, after the husband or the wife had supposedly been sterilized. This is becoming a very
sensitive situation, and it is a place where many of
your colleagues have gotten into trouble. In one
case which I read, no tests were run after the
vasectomy was performed to determine whether
there were any sperm. Others have given assurances
to the patients that if they let the physicans perform
the operation they would not have any more children. That is what I mean by not giving any guarantees. Do not say anything that can be construed as a
guarantee. Be sure that the consent form you use spells
this out clearly and simply, that there is no assurance
that the operation will be effective, and . that there
is no guarantee of any kind.
With respect to the treatment of infants, I
should say that the courts will intervene on behalf
of an infant in a case where treatment is necessary
or where the lack of treatment will be detrimental
to the infant. Cases in point are where courts have
ordered transfusions for Jehovah's Witnesses. In one
case, the court ordered a T / A because the child
needed it and the parents objected.
There are two cases in particular which I have
seen recently where the court approved kidney transplants. One was where the donor was about 27 years
old and mentally incompetent. He had the only
really good matching kidney, and the court gave its
approval for the use of the kidney from the incompetent to help his brother. They had psychiatrists who
came in and testified that this would be of benefit
to the incompetent because he was emotionally and
psychologically dependent upon the well-being of his
brother. Another case was that of twins about nine
years old. The court said there again, based upon
medical testimony, that it would be detrimental to
the surviving infant if he knew that he could possibly have saved the life of his twin but was not given
the opportunity to do so.
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There is one last area of which we should be
aware. That is alienation of affection by doctors on
patients or spouses of patients. The significant thing
is not only the conduct of the physician but the liability of his partners in his conduct. In one case,
involving the pediatrician of a group practice the
husband went to the senior partner, who was the
managing partner, and complained about the pediatrician's conduct toward his wife. The managing
partner did not do anything about it. He did not
even discuss it with his partner, and after it was
over, the court said it was up to the jury to decide
whether this amounted to consent to the conduct of
his partner. If it did, then the partnership, as well
as the man who was involved personally, could be
held ·liable, and this was true even though it did not
involve partnership time.
There was a recent case where a patient and her
husband recovered from a physician-I understand
it was a psychiatrist- $30,000 in compensatory
damages and $120,000 in punitive damages for
alienation of affection. I do not know how long this
had been going on, but it went on long enough for
the jury to decide to punish someone. You should be
aware of the fact that malpractice insurance does not
cover punitive damages. Even if there is coverage
for compensatory damages-and it is questionable
whether there is, in that kind of case-there certainly would not be for the punitive damages. You
would have to pay that out of your own pocket.
In this regard, never examine any female patient
without your nurse being present. It has almost
reached the point where you should not even talk to
her without your nurse being present.
Some of the matters I have referred to may
seem unusual or unlikely and thus may not be long
remembered. Let me reiterate, however, the importance of two items in particular. If nothing else remains long in your minds, do not forget that complete and adequate records are essential, both in the
hospital and in the office. Nothing else will take their
place when they are needed. Finally, keep in mind
always the significance of informed consent. It is a
rapidly changing principle and one which touches
literally every field of medicine. It may be difficult
to accept in all its aspects. You may not, probably
do not, agree with much of it, but it is here to stay.
It is an established legal concept, and it is far better
to recognize it as such and learn to live with it rather
than be caught by it. Good luck!

